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v. 
UTAH CONCRETE PIPE CO., and/or 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20100163 
h ^ 
JURISDICTION 
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commission's denial 
of workers' compensation permanent disability benefits in Geoifge Olsen's case. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§63G-4-403(l). 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the Labor Commissioner erred in her application of the 
"odd-lot" doctrine to Olsen's claim for permanent total disability benefits where she failed 
to recognize or analyze any of the four factors required to be addressed pursuant to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Marshall v. Industrial Comm 9n. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: Questions as to whether the Labor 
Commissioner properly applied the facts under the "odd-lot" doctrine are subject to a 
correction of error standard. Nucor Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 
(Utah 1992). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
PROCEEDING: This issue was preserved in Olsen's Motion for Review. (Record at 
62-75.) 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the Labor Commissioner's Findings of Fact are adequate 
wherein she has ignored virtually all evidence favorable to Olsen. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: "Whether the findings [of fact] are 
adequate is therefore a legal determination that requires no deference to the Commission." 
Adams v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1991). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
PROCEEDING: This first became an issue when the Labor Commissioner supplanted 
the ALJ's findings of fact with her own and was therefore not argued in the Administrative 
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Agency. This is Olsen's first opportunity to raise the issue of Ithe adequacy of the Labor 
Commissioner's factual findings. 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the Labor Commissioner's violation of Olsen's due 
process rights by sitting on his Motion for more than 38 monthp has compromised the 
Commissioner's office to the extent that office cannot maintain objectivity on this case. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: "Due process challenges are 
questions of law that we review applying a correction of error standard." West Valley City 
v. Roberts, 993 P.2d 252 (Utah 1999). Furthermore, the decision making process of an 
agency is reviewed under a correction of error standard when tie statutes at issue are 
unambiguous and subject to traditional methods of statutory construction. King v. 
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1290 (Utah App. 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
PROCEEDING: This first became an issue when the Commissioner took 38 months to 
address Olsen's Motion for Review and was therefore not argued in the Administrative 
Agency. This is Olsen's first opportunity to raise the due process violation by the Labor 
Commissioner. 
DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 11: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for ari injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
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of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay." 
UTAH CONST. Art. XVI, § 2: 
"The legislature shall provide by law for a Board of Labor, Conciliation 
and Arbitration which shall fairly represent the interests of both capital 
and labor." 
UTAH CODE ANN. §63G-4-208(l)(a) and (c): 
"Informal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) within a reasonable time after the hearing,... the presiding 
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes: 
(a) A statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based 
exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative 
Proceedings or on facts officially noted.. . . 
(c) A statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-301(6)(a): 
(a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other filings, or 
oral argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules, 
die agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on review. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-403(4)(g): 
"(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review 
has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:... 
(g) The agency action is based upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-404(l)(b)(i): 
"In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-2-223(l): 
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"A trial court judge shall decide all matters submitted for final 
determination within two months of submission, unless circumstances 
causing the delay are beyond the judge's personal control." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner George Olsen suffered a traumatic amputation and resultant 57% whole 
person impairment of his right arm on November 6, 1963 while acting in the course and 
scope of his employment with Respondent Utah Concrete Pipe (Company. Within 
approximately one week of losing his arm, Olsen returned to work and proceeded to work 
for 23 plus years until he became eligible for early retirement. During that time, Olsen 
experienced substantial chronic pain. He was required to work an additional three hours 
per day to compensate for the loss of his arm and dominant hand. As he aged, it became 
more and more difficult to put in the additional hours and work through the pain. At age 
61, Olsen told his supervisor, that in 18 months, when he became eligible, he would take 
out early retirement because of the pain and the serious cellulites and infections he had 
developed in what remained of his right arm. Because of this Ike explained he could not 
continue to fulfill his duties without his dominant right hand and arm. 
Olsen retired as soon as he was eligible. In so doing, hq incurred a significant 
penalty in both his company pension and social security retirement benefits. The factors 
which Olsen considered in deciding to retire early was the stress of the job, including the 
long hours, hiring and training new employees, and travel for wprk in light of the problems 
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he was having with his right arm. 
Olsen was never made aware of the fact Workers9 Compensation provided for 
permanent total disability benefits, as such he never made a contemporaneous filing for 
workers' compensation disability benefits. He was first made aware of his eligibility for 
permanent total disability benefits in 2006 when he was having difficulty obtaining 
insurance approval related to equipment needed for his prosthetic device. He sought legal 
counsel for the concerns related to his prosthetic and was informed of the Utah code as it 
related to the permanent total disability claim. As such, Olsen, through legal counsel, 
filed a claim with the Labor Commission for permanent total disability benefits. Olsen 
has claimed throughout the case that he is permanently disabled under the "odd-lot" 
doctrine, as he had returned to work for a substantial period of time and, as such, the legal 
analysis under Marshall and its progeny must apply. The case was eventually tried in 
Parowan, Utah, before then ALJ Dale Sessions, wherein Olsen presented his case 
consistent with the factors set forth under Marshall pursuant to the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
After hearing, the ALJ made several convoluted findings, many of which were not 
supported anywhere in the record, ignored all facts favorable to Olsen and through a 
bizarre analysis determined that Olsen was not permanently totally disabled, finding that as 
he had worked for a period of approximately 24 years, he was not entitled to benefits under 
the "odd-lot" doctrine. Obviously, the ALJ did not understand the very nature of the 
"odd-lot" doctrine. 
Olsen timely filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commissioner alleging 
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numerous improprieties in Judge Sessions' "Findings of Fact" and analysis of the 
"odd-lot" doctrine. The Labor Commissioner supplanted the ALJ's findings of fact with 
those of her own and then proceeded to misapply the "odd-lot" doctrine to those facts. 
This appeal proceeds from the Commissioner's failure to correctly interpret and 
apply the "odd-lot" doctrine based on the undisputed facts, failure to set forth the facts 
which supported the ultimate findings as well as any meaningful analysis of the subsidiary 
facts that would show how and why the Labor Commissioner reached her decision. Olsen 
further appeals the Labor Commissioner's decision on the basis that the serious delay in 
adjudicating his case violated the Utah Administrative Procedures Act as well as Olsen's 
constitutional rights under the Due Process and Open Courts clauses of the Utah 
Constitution, placing in question the Commissioner's objectivity as such a violation has 
compromised her office.1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. While working in the course and scope of his employment on November 6, 
1963, Petitioner George Olsen ("Mr. Olsen") suffered a compensable industrial accident 
when he stuck his arm inside a conveyor belt to clear away small pieces of rock when 
suddenly the belt began to move and caught his arm. Mr. Olseti's right arm was 
1 As an initial matter, Olsen and Respondent Utah Concrete Pipe Company reached a tentative settlement in this case 
through participation in the Appeals Court's mediation program. That settlement is awaiting approval by the Labor 
Commission. However, until such time as the Labor Commission approves the settlement, Olsen must name Utah 
Concrete Pipe Company as a Respondent in this appeal. 
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amputated just below the elbow. (Record at 98.) 
2. Within a week of the accident, Mr. Olsen returned to work at the same job 
without duty modifications or medical restrictions. (Record at 98.) 
3. Olsen testified that he experienced a constant pain in his right arm, which he rated 
at a five on a scale of zero to ten. Furthermore, Olsen testified that the pain increased with 
activity. (Record at 118.) 
4. In November 1984 Olsen was diagnosed with cellulitis of the right arm and was 
treated by Dr. Christian for this condition. (Record at 102-103, Medical Records Exhibit 
at page 403-406) 
5. Olsen testified that around the time of the cellulitis in 1984, his physical 
condition was deteriorating with the cellulitis and with activity. As such, he made the 
conscious decision to attempt to work to age 62 so he would be eligible for early retirement 
even though he would sustain significant penalties of 30% in both his company pension 
and his social security retirement benefits by retiring early. He was not aware of the 
availability of workers' compensation permanent total disability benefits. (Record at 121, 
124-125) 
6. Olsen's decision to retire early because of problems related to his amputation is 
supported by Olsen's correspondence to his boss on July 31, 1986. Olsen sent his boss a 
letter indicating, "some 18 months ago, due to some health problems that were not 
responding to medical treatment, I indicated to you my desire to take early retirement any 
time after mid-year 1986. Since these same health problems still persist, I appreciate the 
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positive steps you have taken to make arrangements for my replacement." (Record at 49.) 
7. As to Olsen's reason for retiring early, Olsen testified as follows: 
AJP: Is there some reason that you quit work at that point? 
GO (Olsen): I was having a lot of difficulty with this, with the stress, with the 
pain. 
AJP: With "this" being what? 
GO: My right arm. The pain. I was going downhill physically. And, I 
had to do a lot of training with my job. There was a lot of turnover in the 
work force, and every time you would hire a new persoq, you would have to 
train them. 
AJP: Did that have any impact on your arm? 
GO: Yes, it had an impact on my arm. 
AJP: How did it impact your arm? 
GO: Well, you try to demonstrate different things to thefln? 
AJP: Like what? 
OLSEN: Huh? 
AJP: Like what? 
OLSEN: Like how to measure, how to weigh things, how to handle things. 
It's a process in most cases, you have to be careful how to handle fresh 
concrete, not totally cured concrete, those type of things,! 
it. 
(Record at 119.) 
without damaging 
8. Dr. Chase indicated that for 40 years Olsen's left handlhad to do the work of two 
hands. (Record at 109.) 
9. As he aged it got more and more difficult for Olsen to work the long hours 
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necessary to perform the work of two hands with one hand. (Record at 119.) 
10. Olsen did in fact retire after working for 23 plus years at age 62 lA. Olsen never 
applied for workers' compensation disability benefits until he was made aware of the 
existence of those benefits through legal counsel in 2006. (Record at 121.) 
11. Olsen presented the following additional evidence concerning the conditions 
under which he worked after the traumatic amputation of his right arm: 
a. It took additional time to perform his daily work, Olsen stated, "well, it 
added at least 2, possibly 3 hours to get the things done that I needed, 
and my normal work day was, you know, nine, ten hours anyway. So, 
it took a great deal more than that. It increased the work day 
"conservatively, to 12 hours." (Record at 113.) 
b. Regarding difficulty completing reports, Olsen stated, "actually it took more 
time, because struggling to fill out reports with my left hand. It took a great 
deal more time than it used to take with my right hand." (Record at 113.) 
c. Regarding difficulty answering the phone, Olsen stated, "well, if it was a 
situation where I need to write notes or anything, I would have to put the 
phone up here in order to write, you know, by ear. Yeah, it was a bit of 
difficulty." (Record at 115.) 
d. Regarding difficulty writing with his non-dominant left hand as opposed to 
his right hand, Olsen responded he was "never" as good with his right hand 
and he was not nearly as fast as he was prior. (Record at 115-116.) 
e. Olsen testified that he probably worked 12 hours per day after the accident to 
compensate for the loss of his right arm where he had worked nine hours per 
day prior. (Record at 113.) 
12. In addition to the above difficulties, Olsen attempted to demonstrate to the ALJ 
how difficult activities of daily living had become after the accident in the following ways: 
a. Simply getting dressed would take "probably 10, 15 minutes" longer with 
the help of his wife. (Record at 116.) 
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b. Going to the restroom would take approximately "7 or 8" more minutes. 
(Record at 117.) 
13. Olsen attempted to further explain the difficulties he fyad with activities of daily 
living even as it related to eating a meal. The ALJ, not understanding the very nature of the 
"odd-lot doctrine" cut off this testimony indicating, "[i]t is within common experience of 
the Court to accept that his life has been impacted. I think yout point is well taken. But I 
do think we need to focus more on the elements that are required for the proof, for him to 
establish his claim today, as opposed to make him go through some things that may just be 
uncomfortable to discuss and address." (Record at 117.) 
14. Respondents did not dispute Olsen9s testimony and, in fact, did not call one 
witness to refute the conditions under which Olsen worked after the accident. (Record at 
162 and 104 - 164, generally.) 
15. None of the Respondents presented evidence via medical records, written 
evidence or testimony that disputed Olsen's testimony establishing the traumatic 
amputation of his right arm as the motivating factor for Olsen's early retirement. (Record 
at 162.) 
16. Additionally, Dr. Lewis, one of Olsen's physicians staged: 
I am currently retired from medical practice and have been retired since 
September of 1994. Any medical records I may have had on this man 
have been destroyed. However, I do remember this man well. I recall 
that he impressed me as being an intelligent, responsible and sensitive 
person and responded in a reasonable and mature way to the devastating 
accident and subsequent loss of his right arm. I understand he 
continued to work for many years in spite of this terrible injury. The 
loss of this arm undoubtedly had a profound negative effect on his 
physical and mental health and any special consideratipn or benefit he 
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is entitled to should certainly be extended to this man. 
(Record at 102,103, Medical Records Exhibit at page 4062.) 
17. Dr. Hunter, one of Olsen's treating physicians stated that Olsen was required to 
be off work from January 1987 to the present as his line of work required "hands on skills." 
Dr. Hunter indicates "I believe he severely tried to do his work as a supervisor and got into 
other health problems because of the stress and effort." Dr. Hunter opines that "his loss of 
function and disability are major and irreplaceable." Dr. Hunter states that "his chronic 
stress and disability in his dominant hand are one and are permanent." (Record at 
102-103, Medical Records Exhibit IB at page 407.) 
18. After Olsen filed for permanent total disability benefits, Respondents had Olsen 
evaluated by insurance medical evaluator Bart Fotheringham. Dr. Fotheringham 
determined Olsen sustained a 57% whole person impairment as a result of the traumatic 
amputation of his right upper extremity. (Record at 102-103, Medical Records Exhibit at 
page 50.) 
19. The ALJ, who has since been released by the Labor Commissioner for a series of 
legal errors, non-judicial demeanor, and incompetence generally, issued inappropriate 
findings such as the following: 
a. Ignoring all evidence as to the impact of the amputation on Olsen's activities 
of "daily living" at work. 
b. Ignoring all evidence as to the impact of the amputation on Olsen's activities 
2 The final page of the Medical Record Exhibit was actually page 406. This record was received into 
evidence and as a clerical error was also numbered page 406 of Exhibit IB. 
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of "daily living" at home. 
c. After refusing to permit Olsen to testify as to the impact of the amputation on 
Ms daily activities, and declaring that it was "within common experience of 
the court" to know what life is like for a 62 year old with one arm, made no 
findings as to what "common experience" would dictate as to the impact on 
the life of a one-armed man. (Record at 50-58, 98 - 100.) 
d. Ignoring, it is entirety, Olsen9 s testimony regarding his reason 
for early retirement. 
e. Finding "[t]here is no contemporaneous treating record to show objectively 
that he was adversely imdacted by his amputation to a level that would have 
caused his retirement" in spite of the records from Dr. Lewis, Dr. Hunter, Dr. 
Christian and Dr. Chase t{> the contrary. (Record at 53.) 
f. Finding the traumatic amputation played no factor in Olsen9 s retirement, 
claiming "it appears morelikely from the medical record and other evidence 
that the Petitioner retired lorn his non-industrial causes and not as a result of 
his industrial injury" whemin fact there are no other medical records 
supporting that conclusioil (Record at 52 and record generally.) 
20. Based on these erroneous findilgs, the ALJ concluded, as a matter of law, that 
Olsen did not satisfy the "odd-lot" criteriias he had worked for a period of almost 23 years. 
In so doing the ALJ failed to recognize that Marshall applied tQ a situation where an 
injured worker goes back to work for a substantial period of time. (Record at 57). 
21. Olsen, on November 16, 2006, filed a Motion for Review challenging the 
sufficiency of the ALJ's finding and the lack of any meaningful analysis as it relates to the 
"odd-lot" doctrine. (Record at 62-75). 
22. More than 38 months after Olsen filed the Motion for Review, with no 
justification for the delay, the Labor Commissioner issued an order affirming the 
determination of the ALJ. 
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23. However, in doing so, the Commissioner recognized the obvious inadequacies in 
the ALJ's findings and consistent with authority granted by statute supplanted the ALJ's 
findings with her own. 
24. Unfortunately, the factual findings and the legal analysis of the Commissioner 
are woefiilly inadequate. She devoted barely one page to the factual findings in this case. 
And like the ALJ, ignored reference to a single medical record addressing the problems 
Olsen was having with his right arm at the time he retired. Instead, she offered a broad 
summary of some of the evidence presented in the case, ignoring entirely the medical 
record as well as the following undisputed facts which were presented as evidence at the 
time of Hearing: 
a. With respect to the manner in which Olsen worked after the traumatic 
amputation of his arm, the Commissioner stated, "Mr. Olsen developed 
adaptive techniques to partially mitigate these problems." While the 
Commissioner indicated that the traumatic amputation of Olsen's right arm 
deprived him of his dominant hand, made it more difficult for him to attend 
to personal matters such as dressing and grooming and acknowledged the 
fact that it took longer for Olsen to perform his job duties, her factual 
analysis lacks any examination of the specific conditions under which Olsen 
testified he had worked for 24 years, including the fact that he had been 
required to work 12 hour days on a regular basis as opposed to nine prior to 
the accident. (Record at 98.) 
b. In terms of the pain under which Olsen labored after his injury, the Labor 
Commissioner made minimal factual findings. Again, there was no 
reference whatsoever to the medical record. Despite the fact that Olsen had 
offered specific testimony about the continuous nature, pain levels and the 
fact that his pain was increasing and subject to infection in the 18 months 
before he retired, the Commissioner discounted the true nature of Olsen's 
pain levels when she stated that Olsen "experienced chronic moderate pain" 
which was "essentially stable." (Record at 98.) 
c. With regard to the reasons for Olsen's decision to retire, the ALJ made a 
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factual finding that his decision "stemmed from several factors." The 
Commission determined that these factors included Olsen's age, the stress 
level of his work, the difficulty of hiring and training new workers, and the 
need to travel. The Commissioner further made a factual finding that Olsen 
believed his health was declining and indicated "the pain and functional 
limitations from his work injury added additional burdens." However, the 
Commission failed to take Olsen's testimony in its context and ignored the 
uncontroverted testimony that the "health problems which motivated Olsen's 
decision to retire early" related to the increasing pain he was having in his 
arm, the infections in his right arm that he had begun to experience, and the 
difficulty continuing work with his amputated arrti. (Record at 98, 
120-121.) 
d. With regard to Olsen's employability, the Commissioner failed to take into 
account Olsen's age, mental capacity, social environment, and medical 
impairment in evaluating Olsen's disability. 
e. The Commissioner failed to acknowledge a single medical record in relation 
to Olsen's employability, including the fact that the IME doctor had 
determined that Olsen had a 57% whole person impairment rating related to 
the amputation of his right arm. (Record at 97-101, 102-103, Medical 
Records Exhibit at page 50.) 
f. The Commissioner devoted two paragraphs to legal analysis under the 
"odd-lot" doctrine, erroneously indicating she could not apply the "odd-lot" 
doctrine because Olsen had, in fact, returned to work for 23 years. (Record 
100-101). 
25. It is from the Labor Commissioner's Order Affirming the ALJ's Decision to deny 
workers' compensation benefits which Petitioner appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
George Olsen lost his arm in an industrial injury in 1963. He returned to work for 
the following 23 plus years. During that time, Olsen experienced substantial pain which 
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was constantly a five on a zero to ten scale. He regularly worked twelve hour days to 
complete the job duties that had previously taken him nine. 18 months before Olsen took 
early retirement at age 62, he discussed with his supervisor, Gailon B. Smith, the fact that 
he was experiencing increasing pain and problems with his right arm, including cellulitis, 
and would not be able to continue to work long term. Olsen did not file for workers' 
compensation disability because he was not aware that such benefits were an option. At 
age 62 V2, Olsen took early retirement, incurring a 30% penalty in both his company 
pension and Social Security retirement benefits as a result of retiring early. Because of the 
problems Olsen was having with his right arm, he was essentially compelled to retire. 
Upon finding out he was eligible for workers' compensation disability benefits, and 
upon the advice of legal counsel, Olsen filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits 
in 2006. Due to the nature of Olsen's traumatic right arm amputation, the fact that he 
returned to work for a substantial amount of time, and he was forced to retire early because 
of the arm amputation, Olsen's claim for permanent total disability falls under the 
"odd-lot" doctrine. Under the "odd-lot" doctrine, the Labor Commission is not permitted 
to deny permanent total disability benefits based simply on the fact that an individual with 
permanent industrial injuries returns to work or because he stops working at the age of 
retirement. Marshall v. Industrial Coram 'n, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984); Norton v. 
Industrial Comm % 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986); Peck v. Eimco Process Equip. Co., 748 
P.2d 572 (Utah 1987). In fact, Marshall provides the framework for evaluation of a 
permanent total disability case where the injured worker goes back to work for a 
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substantial period of time and then quits that work because of the sequelae of the industrial 
injury. 
Under Marshall and its progeny, the Labor Commission is required to engage in a 
fact-intensive analysis concerning not the fact that the individual returned to work, but the 
conditions under which that employee worked after the industrial injury. As part of this 
analysis, the Labor Commission is required to consider whether the injured worker 
continued to work under substantial pain. Norton. Similarly, the Labor Commission is 
required to make detailed factual findings as to whether the industrial injury was a 
motivating factor in an employee's decision to retire in claims for permanent total 
disability. Peck. Finally, the Labor Commission is further required to take into account 
the individual's age, mental capacity, social environment and medical impairment in 
making a determination as to whether he is permanently totally disabled. Marshall; 
Norton; Peck. 
In this case, the Commissioner failed to comply with the analytical requirements of 
the "odd-lot" doctrine. The Commissioner neither considered the factors which she was 
mandated to consider, nor did she make sufficient factual findings to show how and why 
she denied benefits to Olsen. Based on the limited factual findings and legal conclusions 
made by the Commissioner, her denial is based squarely on the fact that Olsen returned to 
work, worked a substantial amount of time, and waited until he was eligible for retirement 
to cease working. However, a denial of permanent total disability benefits for those 
reasons alone is patently prohibited by the "odd-lot" doctrine as established by the Utah 
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Supreme Court, some 20 years ago. 
Turning to the inadequacy of the Commissioner's factual findings, she failed to 
reference a single medical record relating to Olsen's amputation, or a single piece of 
evidence within its context supporting her determination that Olsen's decision to take early 
retirement was motivated by "other factors." The Commissioner is required to make 
factual findings that "disclose the steps taken by the Commission in reaching its 
decision[s]." Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 5 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1991). 
In this case, the Commissioner provided a general reference to the facts of this case, 
ignored the bulk of the undisputed evidence, and failed to disclose how or why she made 
the factual findings and legal conclusions she did. Under these circumstances, there is not 
sufficient information to allow an appellate court to meaningfully review the 
Commissioner's decision without combing through the record itself. Consequently, the 
Commissioner's factual findings are inadequate as a matter of law. 
Finally, the Commissioner sat on this case more than 38 months, without any 
justification. That is a violation of Olsen's due process rights to have a determination of 
his case in a "reasonable" period of time pursuant to UAPA. Under these circumstances, 
Olsen respectfully submits that his rights, pursuant to UAPA, to a decision within a 
"reasonable time" as well as protected under the due process and open courts clauses of the 
Utah Constitution, were violated. The Commissioner has so compromised her position as 
the ultimate finder of fact in this case that she is in no position to render an unbiased 
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opinion. 
For these reasons, Olsen respectfully requests that the Commissioner's decision be 
reversed and that this Court analyze Olsen's case pursuant to the "odd-lot" doctrine 
promulgated in Marshall and its progeny and take into account! the undisputed evidence, 
including medical records and the unrefuted testimony of Olsert 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Labor Commissioner Erroneously Interpreted and Applied the "Odd-
Lot" Doctrine With Respect to Olsen's Claims3. 
The Commissioner erred when she disregarded uncontrqverted evidence, including 
all of the medical records, and failed to consider Olsen's claims under well-established 
analytical framework of the "odd-lot" doctrine. Based on the limited information 
provided in her Order Affirming ALJ's Decision, the Commissioner apparently denied 
benefits based on the conclusory presumption that Olsen's return to work for a substantial 
period after the traumatic amputation of his arm and decision to i work until he was eligible 
for retirement. In so doing, the Commissioner erroneously interpreted 20 years of Utah 
Supreme Court precedent with respect to what it required in analyzing cases under the 
"odd- lot" doctrine and misapplied the uncontroverted facts to the case - where they were 
applied at all. The appropriate standard of review of the Labor Commissioner's decision 
3 As the Labor Commissioner is the ultimate finder of fact, pursuant to statute, Olsfcn will not address the 
inadequacies of the ALJ's "findings" as the Commissioner has obviously supplanted those findings with her own. 
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is for correction of error. Nucor Corp. v. State Tax Comm % 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 
1992). 
The common thread in "odd-lot" cases is that an employee sustains a permanent 
industrial injury and then continues to work for a period of time until he reaches a point 
where he can no longer work full time because of that injury. Marshall v. Industrial 
Comm % 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984)(employee continued to work after industrial low back 
surgery until he retired.); Norton v. Industrial Comm % 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 
1986)(employee injured his neck and shoulder at work and continued to work an additional 
six years.); Peck v. Eimco Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572 (Utah 1987)(employee 
injured his knee and low back in two industrial accidents, continued to work until he was 
eligible for retirement.) Because Olsen lost his arm in 1963, the applicable permanent 
total disability statute that applies is §35-1-67. Furthermore, the "odd-lot" doctrine as set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Marshall and its progeny was applicable to the time 
period in which Olsen was injured. See Marshall. 
Under the "odd-lot" doctrine, "total disability may be found in the case of workers 
who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will not be 
employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor market." Peck v. Eimco 
Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572, 574 (Utah 1987)(quoting Marshall v. Industrial 
Comm % 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984)). As for the mechanics of an "odd-lot" case, an 
employee establishes a prima facie case of total disability by presenting "evidence that he 
can no longer perform the duties required in his occupation and that he cannot be 
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rehabilitated to perform some other type of employment." Peck at 575. The burden then 
shifts to the employer to prove the existence of regular, steady work that the employee can 
perform given his education, mental capacity and age. Id. And finally, "[fjailure by the 
employer to meet its burden of proof entitles the employee to permanent total disability 
benefits." Id. 
In analyzing a case under the "odd-lot" doctrine, it is certainly proper for the Labor 
Commission to consider the fact that an injured employee returned to work. Norton at 
1027. However, the employee's return to work must be considered in light of other 
factors such as whether the employee worked despite substantial pain from the industrial 
injury, the circumstances under which he continued to work, arid whether the industrial 
injury was a motivating factor in discontinuing work. Norton at 1027 - 1028; Peck at 578. 
Furthermore, the Labor Commission is also required to teke into account the 
employee's "age, sex, education, economic and social environment,... [and] permanent 
impairment." Marshall at 211. Indeed, it is reversible error f of the Labor Commission to 
deny permanent total disability benefits based only on the fact that an injured worker 
returned to work, even for a substantial period of time. Norton, It is likewise reversible 
error for the Labor Commission to deny the same benefits based on the fact that an 
employee waited until he is eligible to retire. Peck at 578 (stating, "[t]he mere fact that an 
employee has retired will not adversely affect a determination of permanent total disability 
when the employee has demonstrated that his disability from the industrial injury 
significantly influenced his decision to retire.") 
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In Norton, the Utah Supreme Court set forth the nature of such error in some detail: 
[The ALJ] erred when he failed to consider the condition under which 
Norton continued his employment, as manifested by his finding 'the very 
fact that the applicant continued to work in underground mining for six years 
following his accident is convincing evidence that his accident did not render 
him permanently and totally disabled." Norton's decision to return to work 
did not automatically disqualify him from receiving permanent total 
disability benefits, where the facts indicate that throughout the remainder of 
his employ he was not restored to health. The evidence is undisputed that 
Norton spent the last six of his working years in considerable pain. 
Provided that a worker's disability was also analyzed within the 
framework of the "odd-lot" doctrine, case law dealing with the factor of 
substantial pain has generally held that "[a] worker who cannot return 
to any gainful employment without suffering substantial pain is entitled 
to compensation benefits for total disability." Comeaux v. Cameron 
Offshore Services, Inc., 420 So.2d 1209 (La. App. 1982). (Emphasis 
added.) 
Norton at 1027 -1028. 
The Norton Court explained that a permanent total disability claim under the 
"odd-lot" doctrine had to be analyzed in this manner so that an injured worker's 
disability status would be "undistorted by such factors as business booms, sympathy 
of a particular employer or friends, temporary luck, or the superhuman efforts of 
the claimant to rise above his crippling handicaps." (Id. at 1028)(quoting Calogero 
v. City of New Orleans, 397 So.2d 1252, 1254 (La. 1980) (Emphasis added). 
Likewise, the Norton court recognized that it might be years before a man would 
feel the effects of am industrial injury, which could cause significant disability to an 
individual. Finally, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the purpose behind the 
Workers' Compensation laws, "It need not be restated at great length that the 
Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed and that any doubt with 
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respect to the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured 
employee." Norton at 1028 (internal citations omitted). 
In this case, the Commissioner committed error when she neglected to follow the 
analytical framework set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Marshall, Norton, and Peck 
in considering Olsen's claim of total disability under the "odd-lot" doctrine. The 
Commissioner engaged in scarcely two paragraphs of legal analysis of Olsen's claims 
where the crux of its reasoning was that Olsen returned to work after losing his arm and 
could perform his job for the next 23 years until he was eligible to retire. (Record at 100.) 
Olsen does not dispute that it was proper for the Commissioner to weigh these facts. 
Olsen respectfully submits, however, that the Commissioner committed error when she 
ended her analysis there and relied on that to deny total disability benefits. There are four 
significant factors which the Commissioner should have considered, and which she did 
not, in analyzing Olsen's claim. She failed to meaningfully examine the conditions under 
which Olsen worked after his injury. She failed to take into account the substantial nature 
of Olsen's pain resulting from the injury. She failed to properly address the evidence 
concerning Olsen's reasons for retiring. Finally, the Labor Commissioner failed to assess 
Olsen's claim in terms of his age, mental status, social environment, and medical 
impairment. Olsen respectfully submits that a failure to consider any one of these factors 
constitutes reversible error under the "odd-lot" doctrine as set forth below. 
1. The Commissioner Failed to Consider the Conditions Under Which Olsen 
Returned to Work After the Traumatic Amputation of His Right Arm. 
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The Commissioner was required to consider a number of factors in evaluating 
Olsen9 s disability under the "odd-lot" doctrine. The central point of this analysis is to 
evaluate disability without the distortion of an employee who continues employment via 
the sympathy of friends and employer or the employee's own superhuman efforts. What 
is missing from the Labor Commission's analysis in this case is an examination of the 
conditions under which Olsen continued his employment. 
The Norton Court stated that only where an injured employee returns to work under 
normal conditions will there be a presumption that continued work did not result in a loss 
of earning capacity. In this situation, Olsen never returned to work under normal working 
conditions. He Irad to learn how to write with his non-dominant hand. He had difficulty 
taking phone calls. He had difficulty even going to the restroom. Most importantly, it 
took him three additional hours every day to complete his scheduled work. Under no 
stretch of the imagination can this be considered a return to work "under normal working 
conditions." Counsel would submit that Olsen, in returning to work in one week after 
losing his entire right arm, working for a period of in excess of 23 years with one arm, 
putting in an extra three hours per day to complete his work, taking extra time in every 
aspect of his life, such as going to the restroom, putting on his pants, eating a meal and 
working into his early 60's with the cellulitis and sequelae from his injury are 
"superhuman" by definition. 
However, the Commissioner failed to consider this at all in her legal analysis as it 
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was left out entirely of the Commissioner's factual findings. Instead, the Commissioner's 
conclusions of law refer euphemistically to Olsen's "impressive work ethic" and includes 
the conclusory statement that Olsen "rose to the challenge" of maintaining full time 
employment after losing his right arm. Olsen respectfully submits that this does not 
constitute the level of legal analysis required by established precedent and fails to control 
for Olsen's "superhuman efforts" to provide for his family. 
2. The Commissioner Failed to Factor In the Substantiality Of Olsen's 
Chronic Pain Resulting from the Industrial Injury. 
In like manner, the Commissioner failed to evaluate Olsen's disability in light of the 
substantial pain Olsen suffered as a result of his amputation. Olsen testified that he 
worked for 23 years with pain from his amputation being at a 5 ion a 0 - 10 scale. He 
indicated that this would increase with activity. As he got oldqr, he developed cellulitis 
and it simply became too difficult for him to continue working with that type of pain. He 
likewise communicated this to his supervisor approximately 18 months before he retired. 
The Commissioner merely made a factual finding that Olsen had "chronic moderate pain" 
that was "stable." What exactly "stable chronic moderate pain" is or from whence the 
Commissioner obtained that reference is unknown. 
The Utah Supreme Court established in Norton that the presence of substantial pain 
alone was sufficient basis to reach a determination of total disability. The Commissioner 
sidestepped the issue altogether by focusing on the stability of Olsen's pain rather than the 
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substantial nature of it. There is no discussion in either the findings of fact or conclusions 
of law as to the substantiality of Olsen's pain in evaluating his disability. Neither did the 
Commissioner refer to the medical records, Olsen's cellulitis or Olsen's testimony that his 
pain was increasing in the months and years before he retired. 
The Commissioner states that it "does not minimize the continuing challenges Mr. 
Olsen faced as a result of his work-related impairment, or the pain he suffered from his 
injury." But the Commissioner declined to analyze the nature of the pain Olsen endured 
after his accident under the "odd-lot" doctrine at all. Olsen respectfully submits that there 
can be no greater minimization of the substantial pain that Olsen endured while 
maintaining his employment. 
3. The Commissioner Failed to Analyze Olsen's Reasons For Taking Early 
Retirement Based on the Undisputed Evidence. 
As set forth in Peck, the fact that an injured employee waited until he was eligible to 
retire is not in and of itself a reason to deny permanent total disability benefits. The real 
inquiry is whether the industrial injury was a motivating influence on the employee's 
decision to retire. Again, the Commissioner failed to consider the reasons that Olsen 
retired, not to mention the less-than-ideal circumstances under which Olsen took 
retirement, in evaluating his disability claim. 
Instead, the Commissioner focused on the fact that Olsen worked for a long period 
of time after his traumatic amputation and simply retired because he was eligible to do so. 
26 
Aside from the fact that this is not supported by the evidence, this reasoning is plain error 
under the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
Olsen presented undisputed facts at the hearing that he could no longer maintain the 
stress-level of his job due to the increasing pain and infection he was experiencing in his 
right arm. To the extent that the Commissioner made a factual finding that Olsen's 
reasons for retiring were based on "other factors/' it is not supported by Olsen's testimony 
when taken in its proper context. Neither does the Commissioner's attempt to support her 
determination with what "other" evidence she appears to rely on. 
Olsen testified that approximately 18 months before he retired, he had talked to his 
supervisor, Gailon B. Smith, about the fact that it was getting too difficult to continue 
working with the problems he was having with his arm. Likewise, the court admitted into 
evidence a letter which Olsen sent his supervisor informing him of his intent to retire due to 
health problems. Olsen testified that the "health problems" thatt were compelling his 
decision to retire were the increasing pain and problems he was having that stemmed from 
the amputated arm.4 
The Respondents elicited testimony from Olsen that among the reasons he had for 
retiring were that other men his age with similar work responsibilities were dying due to 
the stress, and that training new employees and the travel associated with his job became 
4 Had the Respondents really believed that Olsen's motivation for retiring was something other than the effects of his 
industrial injury, they could have put the matter to rest by calling Olsen's supervisor as a witness concerning the 
circumstances surrounding Olsen's retirement. However, Gailon B. Smith was conspicuously absent from the 
proceedings and the Respondents chose instead to argue alternate reasons for Olsen's early retirement without a shred 
of competent evidence to support them other than taking Olsen's testimony out of context. Even so, it was error for 
the Labor Commission to rely on such an argument to deny benefits. 
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more stressful and difficult as he aged. However, Olsen qualified these answers with the 
fact that he could no longer maintain those stress levels with the increasing problems in his 
arm. 
Notwithstanding the evidence that is actually on the record, the Commissioner 
focuses her attention exclusively on the Respondents9 questions and Olsen's answers, 
taken out of their full context, and ignored completely the undisputed evidence presented 
which showed that Olsen was compelled to retire as a result of his industrial injury. The 
Commissioner again side-stepped her obligation to consider the facts leading up to Olsen's 
retirement, including the undisputed evidence, and medical records as required by the 
"odd-lot" doctrine and simply concluded that she was "not persuaded" that Olsen's 
industrial injury was a motivating factor in his decision to take early retirement. It is 
difficult to understand how the testimony of Olsen, letter to his employer about the reasons 
for his retirement and the medical evidence from four different physicians of Olsen's 
would not persuade anyone that the reason Olsen retired was because that as he got older he 
could no longer complete his work as a one armed man. 
4. The Commissioner Failed to Consider Olsen's Disability In the Context of 
His Age, Mental Capacity, Social Environment, and Medical Impairment. 
Finally, the Commissioner neglected to analyze Olsen's disability in the context of 
his age, mental capacity, social environment, and medical impairment. Other than the fact 
that Olsen retired at age 62 and 14, there is no discussion of Olsen's disability in light of his 
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age. And there is no discussion at all relating to mental capacity, social environment, and 
medical impairment. Significantly, the IME doctor in this case determined that Olsen had 
a 57% whole person impairment related to the industrial amputation of his right arm. 
Likewise, the Medical Records Exhibit contains medical records which support the fact 
that Olsen was developing infections in his right arm prior to the time he decided to stop 
working. 
However, the Commissioner makes no mention of the extent to which Olsen was 
impaired at all. She makes no effort to reconcile her position denying benefits with the 
records and opinions submitted by Olsen9 s treating physicians, including the fact that 
Olsen was having problems with cellulitis in his right arm exactly as Olsen had testified. 
It was clear error for the Labor Commission not to analyze these factors under the 
"odd-lot" doctrine. 
In this case, the Commissioner commits the very errors which the Supreme Court 
sought to protect against in "odd-lot" cases. The Commissioner misinterpreted the law 
when she failed to evaluate Olsen's disability claim under the framework established by 
Marshall, Norton, and Peck. In like manner, the Commissioner misapplied the facts to the 
law when she failed to take the undisputed evidence into account in analyzing Olsen's 
claim under the "odd-lot" doctrine. As such, Olsen submits that the Commissioner 
committed serious prejudicial error in denying Olsen disability benefits under these 
circumstances and requests that the Labor Commission's decision be reversed consistent 
with all of the factors established by the Utah Supreme Court in "odd-lot" cases as applied 
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to Mr. Olsen's permanent total disability claim. 
B. The Labor Commissioner's Factual Findings Are Inadequate As a Matter 
of Law 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides that a presiding officer must sign 
an order including "a statement of the officer's findings of fact based exclusively on the 
evidence... or on facts officially noted." Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-208(l)(a)(emphasis 
added.) Moreover, the presiding officer must give "a statement of the reasons for 
[his/her] decision." Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-208(l)(c)(emphasis added.) "Whether the 
findings [of fact] are adequate is therefore a legal determination that requires no deference 
to the Commission." Adams v. Board of Review of the Indus, Comm 'n, 821 P.2d 1, 5 
(UtahApp. 1991). 
In Milne Truck Lines, Inc., v. Public Serv. Comm % the Utah Supreme Court held 
that an administrative law agency was required to make findings of fact "on all necessary 
ultimate issues under the governing statutory standards," and that "[i]t is also essential that 
the Commission make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical subordinate 
factual issues are highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is 
a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions." Milne Truck Lines, 720 P.2d 1373, 
1378 (Utah 1986). 
The purpose behind this is to afford the appellate courts a meaningful opportunity to 
review how and why the administrative agency reaches the factual and legal conclusions it 
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does. This applies to the Labor Commission. Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. 
Comm % 821 P.2d l(Ut App. 1991). Further, the Labor Commission's factual findings 
will be inadequate as a matter of law "if they do not disclose the steps taken by the 
Commission in reaching its decision to deny . . . benefits." Id\ at 5. 
As an additional matter, the Utah Supreme Court stated Jn Jones v. California 
Packing Corp., 244 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah 1952), "The law does not invest the [Labor] 
Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, 
competent, credible evidence...." 
Findings of fact are only adequate when they are supported by "substantial 
evidence" viewed by the record as a whole. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g).5 In 
applying the substantial evidence test, a court must review the wjiole record including, "not 
only the evidence supporting the board's factual findings, but also the evidence that fairly 
detracts from the weight of the board's evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 
116 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In this case, and as discussed above, the Commission ignored relevant and critical 
factual information on four separate issues and made findings that lacked evidentiary 
support. First, the Commissioner entirely ignored Olsen's work-related impairment 
including the fact that he put in an extra three hours a day to hisl job and worked under 
5 Because the Labor Commission's factual findings are inadequate as a matter of liw, Olsen is not required to 
marshall the evidence to show that the Commission's decision is not supported by Hsubstantial evidence." However, 
to the extent that Olsen is required to marshall the evidence, he respectfully submits that he has done so in his 
Statement of Facts and that in any event, the only factual dispute in this case centers around the reasons for Olsen's 
early retirement, and which neither the Commission's factual findings nor its legal ponclusions are supported by 
competent evidence whatsoever. 
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substantial pain. Second, the Commissioner ignored the impairments that Olsen has in 
activities of daily living. Third, the Commissioner ignored critical information that Olsen 
retired early because of his traumatic amputation. Fourth, the Commissioner ignored the 
determinations from Olsen's treating physicians as it related to his disabilities associated 
with the traumatic amputation. Finally, the Commissioner determined that Olsen retired 
for non-work related reasons, with no evidence to support such a finding. 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Olsen presented uncontroverted competent 
evidence of his inability to continue working at the time he retired due to his industrial 
injury. Not one of the Respondents came forward with evidence to refute this. Neither 
did the Respondents present evidence that there was regular steady full time work available 
to Olsen at the time he ceased working which did not rely on the sympathy of friends or 
Olsen's superhuman efforts. 
Because the "odd-lot" doctrine requires a fact-intensive inquiry of specific factors, 
the Labor Commissioner is necessarily required to disclose all of the facts upon which she 
relies for her analysis under that doctrine. Likewise, the Commissioner is not permitted to 
simply ignore undisputed evidence in a case. Yet the Commissioner failed to make basic 
factual findings in relation to the factors she was required to consider under the "odd-lot" 
doctrine. Although Olsen presented detailed uncontroverted evidence of his disability, 
the conditions of his employment after the amputation and the superhuman efforts he 
undertook to work after his industrial injury causing him to take early retirement, the Labor 
Commissioner failed to include almost all of this in her factual findings. Neither did the 
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Labor Commissioner refer to what facts were actually at issue ind upon what evidence she 
relied to resolve those issues. 
Instead, the Commissioner offered up a broad and euphemistic summary of Olsen's 
claims and the evidence he presented. She then went on to deny benefits because she 
wasn't "persuaded" that Olsen was totally disabled under the "bdd-lof' doctrine or that 
other work was not available for him at the time of his retirement. 
However, there is not sufficient information to apprise the appellate court of the 
ultimate or subsidiary factual issues and reasons for resolution of those in such a manner as 
to show the analytical steps that lead to the Commissioner's ultimate decision to deny 
Olsen benefits. There simply is not enough information in thei Commission's factual 
findings to allow an appellate court to review how and why the Commission arrived at its 
decision to deny benefits. As such, Olsen respectfully submits that the Commission's 
factual findings are inadequate as a matter of law and this Court should review the record 
and issue a determination consistent with the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
C. The Commissioner, By Sitting On Olsen's Motionlfor 38 Months Has 
Violated His Due Process Rights and Has Compromised Herself to the 
Point She Is No Longer Impartial. 
The delays associated with Mr. Olsen's case have become the norm at the Labor 
Commission. The Commissioner's office routinely holds appeals for three, four or five 
years before issuing an opinion. 
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Counsel for Olsen would submit that as the administrative agency is under the 
exclusive control of the executive branch, concerns with due process and proper legal 
analysis are routinely left by the wayside. While Administrative law, under the direction 
of the executive branch, is less formal than proceedings before a constitutional court, the 
cavalier attitude of the Commissioner in letting motions sit for years is wholly inexcusable. 
It has taken over three and one half years from the filing of the Application for 
Hearing to go through the legal process and present this case to the Court of Appeals. 
Within two weeks of the hearing, the ALJ issued an Order that was clearly contrary to Utah 
law. After more than three years the Commissioner affirmed the ALJ's Order without 
addressing the substance of the Motion for Review. Undoubtedly litigation takes time and 
delays can be expected. However, the actions by the Commissioner in this case are 
deplorable. This is not a case in district court. This is a workers' compensation claim 
which, by Constitution and Statute, must move forward rapidly. The open courts 
provision of the Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay. 
(Emphasis added) 
UTAH CONST, art. I, §11. 
Further, the Constitution provides for workers compensation as follows: 
The legislature shall provide by law for a Board of Labor, Conciliation and 
Arbitration which shall fairly represent the interests of both capital and 
labor. (Emphasis added). 
UTAH CONST, art. XVI, § 2 
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While the open courts provision applies equally to all courts throughout the State, 
the Constitution mandates that a Board of Labor be instituted that fairly represents the 
interests of both capital and labor. This necessarily provides for the even - handed speedy 
resolution of a workers' compensation claim. As Professor Larson points out: 
Once a workers' compensation act has become applicable either through 
compulsion or election, it affords the exclusive remedy for the injury by the 
employee or the employee's dependents [footnote omitted] against the 
employer [footnote omitted] and insurance carrier [footnote omitted]. This 
is part of the quid pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and 
employers are to some extent put in balance, for, while the employer assumes 
a new liability without fault, it is relieved of the prospect of large damage 
verdicts, [footnote omitted] 
2 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Desk Edition, 
§100.01 (2006) 
The procedural law of workers' compensation, like the substantive, takes its 
tone from the beneficent and remedial character of the legislation. 
Procedure is generally summary and informal. The initial handling of 
claims, and perhaps the first review, are administrative [footnote omitted] in 
all but a few states [footnote omitted]. The whole idea is to get away from 
the cumbersome procedures and technicalities of pleading, and to reach 
a right decision by the shortest and quickest possible route [footnote 
omitted]. (Emphasis added). 
3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Desk Edition, 
§124.01 (2006). 
More than 70 years ago, the Utah Supreme Court, espousing those principles 
contained in our Constitution and consistent with most states as indicated by Professor 
Larson, set forth succinctly the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act: 
The whole purpose, plan and intent of the Industrial Act Is to provide a 
simple, adequate and speedy means to all applicants for compensation to 
have their applications heard and determined upon the merits, and to have the 
acts of the Commission as speedily reviewed by this court by any interested 
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party if he thinks that the Commission has exceeded its powers or has 
disregarded some provision of the statute. 
Woldbergv. Industrial Commission, 279 P.609,611 (Utah 1929)(internal citation omitted). 
"The clear intention of the Legislature was 'to substitute a more humanitarian and 
economical system of compensation for injured workmen or their dependents in case of 
their death/ which the more humane and moral conception of our time requires." Park 
Utah Consol Mines v. Industrial Comm'n, 36 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah 1934)(quoting 
Gonzales v. Chinb Copper Co., 29 N.M. 228, 222 P. 903, 904). The act affords, through 
administrative bodies, injured industrial workmen or their dependents simple, adequate, 
and speedy means of securing compensation. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
194 P. 122, 124 (Utah 1920). 
Moreover, the Legislature sought to promote the public welfare by relieving 
society of the support of unfortunate victims of industrial accidents. Salt Lake City v. 
Industrial Commission, 199 P. 152, 154-155 (Utah 1921) (stating, the "cost of human 
wreckage may be taxed against the industry which employs it," rather than the state or 
taxpayers.); Reteuna v. Industrial Commission, 185 P. 535, 537 (Utah 1919). As such, if 
there is any doubt "respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the employee or of his dependents as the case may be." Chandler v. Industrial 
Comm 'n, 184 P. 1020, 1022 (Utah 1919). The speedy and adequate means of securing 
compensation for injured workers "is predicated on the police power inherent in every 
sovereignty — the power to legislate and to govern for the best interests of the state." Utah 
Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm % 194 P. 122, 124 (Utah 1920). 
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The mandate that injured workers have a speedy remedy has been echoed by our 
courts over the decades. 
The purposes which underlie the Workmens' Compensation Act are: to 
assure to the injured employee's dependents an income during the period of 
his total disability and to provide compensation for any resulting permanent 
disability; to accomplish this by a simple and speedy procedure which 
eliminates the expense, delay, and uncertainty in having to prove 
negligence on the part of the employer; and to thus require industry to bear 
the burden of the injuries suffered in it. 
Wilstead v. Industrial Comm % 407 P.2d 692, 693 (Utah 1965)(emphasis added). See 
also, Thomas v. Color Country Management, 84 P.3d 1201, 1213 (Utah 2004). 
Indeed the Utah legislature recognized the need, at least in an administrative setting, 
that all administrative agencies must issue an order "within a reasonable time after the 
hearing." Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-208(l). Moreover, this Court has held that taking 17 
months to issue an administrative opinion does not comply with the mandate to issue 
orders within a reasonable time under UAPA. Rice v. Utah Sees. Div., 95 P.3d 1169 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2004). 
Apparently the Labor Commissioner does not take seriously the mandates from the 
Utah Constitution, the Appellate Courts and the Utah Legislature. Olsen did not receive a 
remedy by "due course of law without denial or unnecessary delay." The Labor 
Commissioner did not "fairly represent" his interests nor did he receive a "simple, 
adequate and speedy" means of securing compensation in this case. Neither was the 
Commissioner's order issued in a "reasonable time". 
There has been nothing simple, adequate or speedy about Olsen's attempt to secure 
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compensation in this case. Further, the delay in this case ensures that the purpose of the 
Workers' Compensation Act will be violated. The delays demonstrated in this case are 
now typical of what occurs in the Commissioner's office. The fact of the matter is that 
people are out of work, taking out bankruptcy and getting divorced because they are unable 
to pay bills. The Commissioner, unfortunately, has taken the position that it is acceptable 
for these cases to drag on for years without resolution. Then, when resolution comes, it is 
~ as in this case — a curt dismissal of claims without any meaningful analysis. 
District Court judges deal with much more complex issues, yet are required by 
statute to issue a decision within two months of the hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-7-25. The question which begs to be answered is why a district court judge who is 
presented with complex real estate claims, probate procedures, contract disputes, divorce 
proceedings, criminal cases, and all other manner of disputes must render a decision in two 
months, when the Administrative Law Judge, or the Labor Commissioner herself, in a 
workers' compensation case, dealing with one type of law, cannot render a decision for 38 
months. 
The circumstances for injured workers in this state are in a serious predicament. 
Counsel would suggest that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-404(l)(b)(i) this Court 
has jurisdiction to order the Labor Commission of Utah to act and conform with Utah law. 
Olsen would suggest that issuing a decision in a reasonable amount of time should be 
something less than what is required of a district court judge. There is no reason the Labor 
Commissioner or ALJs cannot issue decisions within 30 days. 
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It is no secret that in a workers5 compensation setting delays always prejudice the 
injured worker. There is never prejudice to an insurance company that simply maintains 
control of its funds for a longer period of time. Injured workers, who are at the mercy of 
the executive branch through the Commissioner's office, are forced to enter into 
settlements they wouldn't otherwise agree to because of such inappropriate delay. 
Additionally, the Commissioner will compromise her ability to impartially analyze the 
decisions of the ALJ. Where an injured worker has been waiting for a decision for three or 
four years, there will always be a tendency to affirm the denial of benefits by the ALJ and 
rationalize that there has been no change in the status quo. Certainly "the injured worker 
couldn't have been prejudiced by the delay occasioned with the Commissioner's inaction 
as she is simply affirming the ALJ." 
Appellate Courts have recognized the impropriety of administrative agency delay 
and the compromising nature of such a delay. In Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Bd, 625 F. 
2d 486, 490 (3d Cir. 1980) the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a three year and 
nine month delay in rendering a decision on an Application for Disability benefits in the 
administrative review process was a clear violation of the Applicant's due process rights 
and was "wholly inexcusable." The Kelly court went on to hold "although there is no 
magic length of time after which due process requirements are violated, we are certain 
three years, nine months, is well past any reasonable time limit when no valid reason for 
the delay is given." 
Due to the compromising nature of the agency's inactivity and delay, the Third 
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Circuit Appeals Court stated "[w]e see no reason why this applicant should undergo 
another bout in the agency. Four years is enough." Id at 492. In the same fashion as the 
denial of disability benefits in Kelly, Mr. Olsen, nor any other injured worker for that 
matter, should be subject to the Commission's blatant disregard for the due process rights 
of injured workers. As such, Olsen requests this court enter an order granting permanent 
total disability benefits consistent with the decision reached in Marshall and its progeny 
pursuant to the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Olsen respectfully requests that the Order Affirming 
ALJ's Decision be reversed and benefits be awarded Olsen by this Court consistent with 
the facts and the legal framework established under the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
DATED this {? day of September, 2010. 
Caron, 
Elizabet^sB>J0rrimshaw 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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Addendum 1 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
GEORGE M. OLSEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH CONCRETE PIPE CO., 
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE CO., 
and EMPLOYERS* REINSURANCE 
FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER AFFI 
ALJ>S DECIS 
RMIN( 
ION 
Case No. 06-0377 
Compensation Act, Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated 
The T^bor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for reviejw pursuant to § 63G-
4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and § 34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act 
RAHRGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr Olsen claims permanent total disability compensation for the accidental amputation of 
his right arm while working for Utah Concrete Pipe Co. on November 6,1963. | After an evidentiary 
hearing Judge Sessions concluded that Mr.- Olsen's work injury had not rendered him permanently 
and totally disabled. Judge Sessions therefore denied Mr. Olsen's claim for compensation. 
In requesting Commission review of Judge Sessions' decision, Mr. Olsen argues that Judge 
Sessions' findings are inconsistent with the evidence presented at hearing and that such evidence 
jstablishes Mr. Olsen's entitlement to permanent total disability compensation. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission has reviewed the entire evidentiary record in this matter and makes the 
bllowrag findings of fact 
Mr. Olsen was bom in May 1924. He graduated from high school and served in the military 
urine World War ft where he was wounded in the leg and also developed a chrcfnic sinus condition. 
fc Olsen then accepted employment as plant superintendant of Utah Concreteis facility at Ogden, 
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Utah. While working there on November 6,1963, Mr. Olsen attempted to clear some rocks out of a 
conveyor apparatus. The conveyor belt unexpectedly began moving, catching Mr. Olsen's right arm. 
As a result of this accident, Mr. Olsen's right arm was amputated just below the elbow. 
Remarkably, in less than a week after the traumatic amputation of his lower right arm, 
Mr, Olsen returned to his regular supervisory duties at Utah Concrete. He was subsequently fitted 
with a right-arm prosthesis and has used a prosthesis through the years since his accident The loss of 
his dominant lower right arm caused Mr. Olsen difficulty in some aspects of his personal and work 
life. It was more difficult for Mr. Olsen to attend to personal matters such as dressing, grooming, 
and the like. At work, it was time consuming for Mr. Olsen to fill out required reports with his left 
hand. Mr. Olsen developed adaptive techniques to partially mitigate these problems. While Mr. 
Olsen experienced chronic moderate pain in his arm after his accident, the arm's condition has been 
essentially stable and he has experienced relatively few medical complications from the injury. He 
uses Tylenol for .the pain and has rejected more potent pain medications due to their side effects. 
In 1969, Mr. Olsen accepted an offer to work as a plant superintendant for Basalt Rock Co. in 
California, In 1976, Utah Concrete—by then known as Amcor—persuaded Mr. Olsen to return to 
its employment, again as a plant superintendant Mr. Olsen returned to Utah and continued working 
as plant superintendant for Amcor until the date of his retirement on December 31,1986. 
At the time of his retirement from Amcor, Mr. Olsen qualified for a company pension and 
social security retirement benefits, as well as a military disability benefit as a result of his war injury. 
After his retirement, Mr. Olsen was called back to work by Amcor on a contract basis as a consultant 
and to design equipment As demonstrated by his work history, Mr. Olsen was a competent and 
sought-after management employee throu^bout the period of his active employment and afterwards 
during his retirement 
Mr. Olsen's decision to retire on December 31, 1986, stemmed from several factors. He 
knew of others his age with similar work responsibilities who he believed had died due to stress, tie 
found it difficult to hire and train new workers. Furthermore, at the time Amcor was acquiring other 
operations throughout the United States and Mr. Olsen was required to travel to those sites as well as 
perform his regular work duties. He believed his health was declining. The pain and functional 
limitations from his work injury added additional burdens. Although Mr. Olsen continued to 
successfully perform his work duties, over a period of several years he came to the conclusion that it 
would be prudent for him to retire when he qualified for his company pension and social security 
retirement benefits-
Mr. Olsen's non-work medical problems include the removal of his thyroid in 1956, several 
years prior to his work accident After his retirement at the end of 1986, Mr. Olsen experienced heart 
arrhydnnia and implantation of a pacemaker, prostate cancer, left carpal tunnel syndrome and 
ganglion cyst, arthritis, depression, and colon polyps. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides various medical benefits and disability 
compensation to employees who suffer work-related injuries. There is no dispute that Mr- Olsen's 
injury is compensable under the Act, and he has previously received medical benefits and permanent 
partial disability compensation. The only issue now in dispute is whether MrJ< 
to permanent total disability compensation. 
Olsen is also entitled 
Mr, Olsen's claim for permanent total disability compensation must bt evaluated according 
to the law m effect on November 6,1963, the date of his work injury. At that fame, §35-1 -67 of the 
Utah Workers* Compensation Act provided for payment of permanent total disability compensation 
but did not set out the standards for evaluating an injured worker's claim for such compensation. 
Instead, those standards were derived from appellate decisions of the Utah Supreme Court such as 
the Court's decision in United Park City Mines Company v. Prescott, 15 Utah410,412 (Utah 1964), 
in which the Court held that: 
[A] workman may be found totally disabled if by reason of the disability resulting 
from his injury he cannot perform work of the general character he was performing 
when injured, or any other work which a man of his capabilities may b$ able to do or 
to learn to do. • . . 
career, 
In light of fee foregoing standard for determining whether an injured worker 
aid totally disabled, the Commission has carefully considered Mr. Olsen's worijc 
and after the accident of November 3,1963. It is apparent that throughout his 
lighly skilled in the technical aspects of his work, competent as a supervisor 
possessed of an impressive work ethic. It is also apparent that Mr. Olsen faced 
tfhen he lost his lower right arm. However, his work record demonstrates! 
challenge and continued on with a successful career over the next 23 years, 
lot minimize the continuing challenges Mr, Olsen faced as a result of his work-
>r the pain he suffered from his injury. Nevertheless, the Commission is not 
actors prevented Mr. Olsen from continuing to work or motivated his decision 
Commission therefore concludes that Mr. Olsen's work injury did not prevent 
"work of the general character he was performing when injured/* Consequently 
atisfy the applicable standards for a detennination of permanent total disability, 
is permanently 
history, both before 
r
, Mr. Olsen was 
and manager, and 
L very real challenge 
that he rose to the 
Commission does 
related impairment, 
persuaded that those 
to retire. The 
from performing 
f, Mr. Olsen does not 
The 
him 
The Commission has also considered Mr. Olsen's argument that he is entitled to permanent 
Dial disability compensation under what is known as the "odd-lot* doctrine, JThe Utah Supreme 
?ourt discussed the application of the odd-lot doctrinein Marshall v. Industrim Commission, 68 3 
'.2d 208,212 (Utah 1984), stating that "{whether or not an employee falls into the odd-lot category 
epends on whether there is regular, dependable work available for the employeb who does not rely 
n the sympathy of friends or his own superhuman efforts/* In this case, the evidence establishes 
aat regular, dependable work was available to Mr, Olsen. In fact, his expertise ajnd abilities were in 
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real demand in the job market before and after his accident, and even after his retirement The 
Commission concludes that the continuing availability of regular and dependable work for Mr. Oisen 
precludes application of the odd-lot doctrine to his claim-
In summary, the Commission finds that Mr. Oisen has not established that he is pennanently 
and totally disabled under the standards in effect at the time of his 1963 accident, nor does Mr. 
Oisen's claim present circumstances that warrant application of the odd-lot doctrine. Consequently, 
the Commission concludes that Mr. Oisen is not entitled to permanent total disability compensation. 
ORDER 
The Commission afffcms Judge Sessions5 decision denying Mr. Olsen's claim for permanent 
total disability compensation. It is so ordered 
Dated this AT day of January, 2010. 
^ 3 L _ l 
SherrieJHayashi 
Utah E^ abor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask && Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any parly may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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